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In his Opening Brief, Travis Perkins asked this Court to overturn his conviction 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. His request was based on two contentions: 
1) the police had violated the curtilage of his living space to obtain evidence against him. 
without either a warrant or sufficient evidence to support a search and 2) that the police 
officer had violated his constitutional rights when he compelled Perkins to come to the 
rear sliding glass door of his condominium, even after Perkins had clearly indicated that 
he did not wish to talk to the police. 
The existence of either of these circumstances is sufficient to render the evidence 
obtained from the improper questioning inadmissible. In its answering brief, the State 
fails to establish the propriety of either action. The evidence obtained after Perkins 
opened his sliding glass door after having been ordered to do so by the police officer 
should be suppressed, and since it is the only evidence of Perkin's guilt, his conviction 
should be overturned. 
A. The State Makes No Meaningful Response to the Contention that A 
Rear Patio That Cannot Be Viewed Or Accessed From Any Public 
Place, Constitutes the Curtilage of Perkin's Residence 
In its answering brief the State concedes that the authority on which Perkins relied 
to support his claim that the police had violated the curtilage of his house is the 
appropriate standard for determining the issue. The State contends that factors set forth 
in the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294. 107 
S.Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987) do not support the conclusion that a rear patio, directly adjacent 
to the sliding glass rear door of a condominium, constitutes "curtilage." 
The State relies on the fact that there were no physical barriers or fences barring 
access to the space, but does not deny that there was no public access to the patio and that 
it could only be reached by walking across non-public space, through unplowed snow, 
uphill. The State offered no evidence :o show that the patio was easily accessible or 
that people routinely approached Perkin's home via its rear entrance. 
Perkins submits that the location of the patio, including the fact that it was not 
readily accessible by public walkways or other common areas, supports the conclusion 
that it was "enclosed by the terrain" and therefore constitutes the curtilage of his home. 
In a location where the natural beauty of the surroundings and the expansiveness of the 
mountain views form a large part of a homeowner's enjoyment of his residence, Perkins 
submits that he should not be required to build a fence or otherwise block his view in 
order to preserve the right to privacy that is otherwise afforded by the physical location of 
his window. 
The one new case cited by the State, State v. Peck, 143 Wis 2d 634, 422 N.W.2d 
160 (Wis. App. 1998) sheds no relevant light on the issues in this case. In Peck, the 
Wisconsin court upheld the arrest of the defendant after the police observed marijuana 
growing in several fields that were distani from the house in which the defendant resided. 
Although some of the marijuana that was seized was within the curtilage, in fact the 
police testified that they originally observed the marijuana from a town road, using 
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binoculars to peer across a forty-acre parcel of adjoining land The court determined that 
"wheie a marijuana patch is visible from an adjoining field, the officer's observations do 
not constitute a search." Id at 639 
More to the point with respect to the issues in this case, the court in Peck also 
stated: "This is not a case where the police used binoculars to peer into a house, 
apartment 01 other enclosed building Such an intrusion would plamh violate a person \ 
expectation of privacy " Id at 639 (emphasis supplied). 
The defendant had the right to assume that the his private patio, immediately 
adjacent to a sliding glass window, was private and that he would be free of unwanted 
and unauthorized observation from that position. It was the curtilage of his house, and 
he was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to any seaich and 
seizuie that commenced from that location 
B. The State Does Not Explain How Rousting Someone From Their 
Residence After That Person Has Initially Refused to Talk to the 
Police, Constitutes a Consensual Interview 
In its Answering Brief, the State contends that when Perkins came to the sliding 
glass door of his condominium, his opening of the door and subsequent conversation w ith 
the officei was "consensual " In making this argument, the State ignores seveial 
important factors that make it clear that the conversation was not consensual and that any 
evidence obtained from the non-consensual questioning of the defendant should be 
suppressed. 
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1. The Trial Court Correctly Found that Police Officer Did Not Have 
Reasonable Suspicion to Detain the Defendant 
The trial court found that the information that the security guard, Muller, had 
given to the police officer "did not amount to reasonable suspicion to detain defendant." 
Opinion, j^ 3. Accordingly, there was not sufficient evidence to support a "Level 2" 
interrogation until after Perkin's had opened his door and the police officer then smelled 
alcohol on his breath. 
The facts in this case are consistent with the court's finding of no reasonable 
suspicion: although the security guard testified that individual he encountered seemed 
slow to respond and appeared to be slurring his speech, he also testified that he was not 
close enough to him to detect if he had ai odor of alcohol. R45:l 1-13. The evidence 
was also that the encounter took place at approximately 3 a.m., so that the physical 
mannerisms observed by the security guard could also have been attributable to the fact 
that the person he was observing was very tired. 
This court should not substitute its judgment of credibility of testimony or 
witnesses for that of the trial judge, who actually heard all of the testimony. The factual 
findings of a trial court may only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. Stale v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932. 935-6 (Utah 1994). Here, the trial court examined the legal 
requirement that a "tip" must be sufficiently reliable to support the conclusion that a 
crime has been committed against the security officer's failure to detect any odor of 
alcohol on the defendant's breath and correctly concluded that the facts reported by the 
4 
security guard to the officer did not support a finding of "reasonable suspicion" that a 
crime had been committed. 
The State's argument that "even if the encounter could be construed as a 
detention, it was justified by at least reasonable suspicion" is contrary to the factual 
finding of the trial court and cannot be sustained. 
2. The Trial Court Erred When It Found that the Questioning of 
the Defendant Was Consensual 
On the other hand, the application of factual findings to the question of whether a 
particular search violated the Fourth Amendment is a mixed question of fact and law that 
must be reviewed non-deferentially. for "correctness." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939, 
On the issue of coercion, the facts are not in dispute: Perkins initially refused to talk to 
the officer and ducked down behind a piece of furniture, only opening the door after the 
officer continued knocking and issued the authoritative statement: "Come here, 1 want 
to talk to you." Perkins submits that the officer's insistence that he come to the window 
and speak with him. after he had initially indicated that he did not wish to do so. was 
coercive as a matter of law. 
The cases on which the State relies - United States v. Cormier, 200 F.3d 1103. 
1109 (9th Cir. 2000): Scott v. State. 782 A.2d 862. 875-6 (Md. 2001) and Gompf v. Stare. 
120 P.3d 980. 986-7 (Wyo. 2005) - all expressly find that the officers did not brandish 
weapons, raise their voices, speak in an authoritative tone or command residents to let 
them in and therefore do not help the State's case. In Cormier, for example, the Ninth 
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Circuit expressly found that the police officer who knocked at Cormier's hotel room door 
did not even identify herself as a police officer, nor did she ever "compel Cormier to 
open the door under the badge of authority." In Gomph, the resident of the house 
"answered the door and invited the officers inside." 120 P.3d at 983. Here. Perkins did 
not open the door and invite the officer inside; he tried to hide behind a piece of furniture 
so as to avoid talking to the officer. Here, the police officer did compel Perkins to open 
the door with his authoritative "come here." 
The State makes no effort to distinguish the case of Stale v Alvey, 2007 UT App. 
161, ffl]4 and 5, on which Perkins relied for the proposition that in Utah, when a police 
officer uses authoritative language to instruct someone to move from one position to 
another, that constitutes a "level 2" detention and not a consensual search. Although the 
State asks the Court to adopt the rationale of a Vermont case, State v. Ford, 2007 VT 
107, 182 Vt. 421, 940 A.2d 687. the State offers no argument as to why this case, if it is 
inconsistent with applicable Utah authority, should become the new rule. 
In fact, however, the principles articulated in State v. Ford are not contrary to Utah 
law. The question of whether the officer's initial conversation with the defendants was 
coercive was not at issue in Ford. Although the factual setting is temptingly similar to 
the one in this case - a tip regarding illegal marijuana usage, together with the 
identification of and location of an automobile (a Subaru) and even "footsteps in the 
snow" to the front door of an apartment - similarity of facts does not mean similarity of 
issues. 
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In Ford, there was nothing to indicate that the defendants' initial opening of the 
apartment door when the police knocked was anything other than consensual The issue 
in Ford was rather whether the officer exceeded constitutionally permissible behavioi 
when he asked the people inside the apartment to step outside, and then furthei when he 
searched them after observing that one of the people was wearing a small knife The 
appellate court found that the defendants had no constitutional right to be questioned 
indoors rather than outdoors, and that the officer was entitled to search foi additional 
weapons once he had identified the existence of a knife 
None of those factors are present in this case Here, the issue is not what 
happened after the door was opened but rathei whether the opening of the door in the fust 
instance was coerced. Specifically, the court in Ford found that the officer had a 
reasonable basis for suspecting that the inhabitants of the apartment had committed a 
crime before he knocked on the dooi, whereas in this case the trial court found that the 
officer did not have a reasonable basis to detain the defendant until after the man 
cowering behind the bed (who turned out to be Perkins) was compelled to come to the 
door by the officer's authoritative "come heie." 
The police officer's insistence upon questioning Perkins, without reasonable 
suspicion to detain him and after he had clearly indicated by his conduct that he did not 
wish to speak with the officei. violated Perkin's right to be free from unreasonable seaich 
and seizure The Fourth Amendment requires that any evidence obtained from that 
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questioning - which was, in fact, the only evidence to support the charges of driving 
under the influence in this case - must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Perkins submits that 
his questioning by a police officer who had invaded his private rear patio and then 
authoritatively directed him to "come here" and answer questions after he had indicated 
he did not wish to talk, violated his constitutional rights. The evidence obtained through 
this illegal questioning must be suppressed and the verdict of driving under the influence 
that was obtained only through the use of such illegal evidence, vacated. 
Respectfully submitted September 21, 2009 
SARA PFROMMER 
Attorney for Travis James Perkins 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of September, 2009, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRAVIS PERKINS was placed in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
DATED this 21 rd day of September, 2009. 
